The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State by Coglianese, Cary
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2017 
The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential 
Control of the Administrative State 
Cary Coglianese 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, President/Executive 
Department Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the 
Rule of Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Coglianese, Cary, "The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the 
Administrative State" (2017). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2126. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2126 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
THE EMPTINESS OF DECISIONAL LIMITS: 
RECONCEIVING PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
CARY COGLIANESE* 
The heads of administrative agencies exercise authoriD' delegated direct!), to them 
through legislation. To what extent, then, may presidents lawfalf:y direct these agency 
heads to carry out presidential priorities? A prevailing view in administrative law holds 
that, although presidents may seek to shape and oversee the work of agency officials, th9 
cannot make decisions for those officials. Yet this approach of imposing a decisional limit 
on presidential control of the administrative state in realiD' fails to provide any meaningful 
constraint on presidential power and actualf:y risks exacerbating the politicization of 
constitutional law. A decisional limit presents these problems because the concept of a 
decision in the governmental setting lacks precision, failing to provide a coherent line 
between permissible oversight and impermissible decisionmaking. A decisional limit also 
cannot in practice be eeforced against either presidents or agencies. Presidents have 
available to them four eav strategies, each documented in this Article, that allow them 
read:)I escape from legal criticism that t� have overridden agencies' autonomy in violation 
of any purported decisional limit. Instead of continuing to invoke an unworkable standard 
that onf:y invites unhelpful politicization of constitutional law, legal scholars would do 
well to invoke the virtues of a bright-line rule in this particular setting and favor a rule 
that requires agency officials to sign off, literall:J, on agency actions before th9 can take 
effect. Such a formal "signature limit" will seroe to constrain presidential power but will 
do so by avoiding the unnecessary risks that a decisional limit poses to law's legitimacy. 
* Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Political Science; Director, Penn Program
on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I appreciate comments provided by 
Kimberly Kirschenbaum, Gabriel Schefiler, Peter Strauss, An Thien Tran, and Daniel 
Walters. Evan Mendelson, Andrew Pasquier, and David Rosen contributed ably in parts as 
research assistants. I presented earlier versions of this paper at the law schools at American 
University and Duke University and am grateful for helpful comments from participants at 
those sessions. As is customary, the views in this paper should not necessarily be attributed 
to anyone whose comments or assistance I have acknowledged 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many of today's most salient controversies over presidential authority 
center on the President's power over the administrative state. Can a 
president properly make recess appointments of the heads of agencies 
during short breaks in congressional business? 1 Do decisions to defer 
enforcement of statutory provisions violate the President's obligation to 
"take care that the laws are faithfully executed"?2 Against the backdrop of 
questions like these lurks a still deeper and persistent question that lawyers, 
legal scholars, and public officials have heatedly debated over at least the 
last several administrations: to what extent may presidents legally direct the 
heads of agencies to carry out presidential priorities when exercising powers 
delegated by statute expressly to the agency heads? 
With respect to this larger question, no one seriously disputes that 
presidents possess the authority and responsibility to oversee what agencies 
do. Nor does anyone contest the President's legal power to remove, at will, 
the heads of executive branch agencies (at least those whose appointments 
are not protected by statutory "good cause" limits).3 The real debate over 
1. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560, 2573 (2014).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Obama Administration's delay in compliance
requirements under the Affordable Care Act and the Administration's efforts to offer certain 
kinds of relief from immigration enforcement gave rise to heated controversy and 
considerable litigation. See genera/bi Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. I 715 (2016); Patricia L. Bellia, Faitliful Execution and 
Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753 (2016). 
3. See MARSHALL j. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE
UNITED STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 144 (2015) ("The President may plainly 
remove certain officials, such as Cabinet secretaries, and other 'officers of the United States' 
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presidential directive authority concerns a president's ability to compel the 
head of an agency to take action consistent with the President's wishes. 
Adherents to the theory of the unitary presidency argue that the 
"Constitution gives presidents the power to control their subordinates."4 
Others who approach the question from the standpoint of statutory 
construction have argued that a president presumptively holds the power to 
direct agency officials absent clear statutory language to the contrary.5 By 
contrast, other scholars have concluded that, even when not specifically 
precluded by statute, presidents "cannot dictate to an agency head" what 
actions to take.6 Such directive power, it is suggested, poses grave dangers 
to modern democratic governments. 7 Professor Bruce Ackerman, for
example, has raised worries about extremist Presidents who "will use their 
White House staff to give the bureaucracy marching orders to implement 
their charismatic visions," leading agencies to "refuse to defer to expert 
assessments of the facts, or traditional understandings of the law."8 
As a bulwark against these legitimate concerns, legal scholars have 
argued for placing a decisional limit on presidential involvement in actions 
by administrative agencies-that is, a limit on the extent to which 
Presidents can actually make or dictate the decisions that agencies are 
authorized by statute to make.9 Professor Robert Percival, for example, has 
for no reason and without explanation."); see also id. at 144-51 (reviewing legal limitations on 
removal authority when statutes require a showing of good cause). 
4. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER s. Yoo, THE UNITARY ExECUTIVE:
PREsIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008); set also id. at 420-27; Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, 77ze President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE LJ.
541, 581 ( 1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: 77ze Framers and the
President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE LJ. 991, 991 (1993).
5. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251,
2384 (2001) (defending presidential directive authority on statutory grounds and arguing for 
its legality because "Congress generally has declined to preclude the President from 
controlling administration in this manner"). 
6. Cass R. Sunstein, 77ze Myth of the Unitary Executive: Presidential Power .from Washington 
to Bush, 7 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 299,306 (1993). 
7. See general{y BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLlNE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (20 IO); Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal 77zrough the New Presidentialism, 22 
HARV.J.L &PUB. POLICY 227,227 (1998). 
8. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 38.
9. The specific use of the term "decisional" in this context appears to owe its origins
to Professor Peter Strauss. Peter L. Strauss, 77ze Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 595 (1984) (arguing that "statutes place 
decisional authority in the agencies"). However, even when this precise terminology is not 
used, the underlying concept of a decisional limit is widely accepted. See Kagan, supra note 
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argued that, although the Constitution affords the President "enormous 
power to influence [ administrators'] decisions, it does not give him the 
authority to dictate substantive decisions entrusted to them by law."10 
Professor Peter Strauss has advanced the view that the Constitution 
authorizes Presidents only to serve as "overseers" of administrative 
agencies, not to become the "deciders."11 Strauss's elegant articulation of a 
5, at 2250 n.8 (characterizing as "generally accepted" the view that presidents cannot 
displace agency decisions); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the R.egulatmy 
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1995) (describing as "the conventional view" the notion 
that "the President has no authority to make [an agency] decision himself, at least if 
Congress has conferred the relevant authority on an agency head"). For more recent use of 
"decisional" phraseology, see, for example, Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the Presi.dent's 
Statutory Authoriv, Over Ageng Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2465 (2011) (referring to 
presidential "directive or decisional authority''); Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative 
Jurisprudence: The Rule of lAw in the Administrative State, 115 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 1985, 1994-97 
(2015) (describing limitations on presidential authority as marking the confines of a 
"decisional allocation"). 
10. Robert V. Percival, Essay, Presi.dential Management of the Administrative State: The Not­
So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE LJ. 963, 966 (2001); see also Robert V. Percival, �Vho's in 
Charge? Does the Presi.dent Have Directive Authoriv, Over Ageng R.egulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2487, 2488 (2011) [hereinafter Percival, Who's in Charge?] (arguing that "even if the 
President has unfettered removal authority over the heads of non-independent agencies ... 
this removal power does not imply the power to control decision making entrusted by law to 
agency heads"). 
11. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or 'the Decider'? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer or Decider?] 
(noting that the "President's role ... is that of overseer and not decider"). Professor Strauss's 
influential article builds on and comports with a rich collection of other seminal scholarship 
of his on the President's role in administration and executive branch policymaking. See, e.g., 
Strauss, supra note 9; Peter L. Strauss, Presi.dential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 965, 977 
(1997). Undoubtedly informed by that body of scholarship, other legal scholars have 
similarly advocated a decisional limit on presidential authority over the administrative state. 
See, e.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 159 (2009) ("The elected President still exerts powerful influence 
over each agency, but final decision making authority on matters that the Constitution 
allows Congress to regulate would rest in those agencies to which our elected Congress 
delegates decision making authority."). Professor Strauss, though, has been described as the 
"leading contemporary def ender" of the distinction between permissible presidential 
oversight and impermissible presidential decisionmaking on matters for which Congress has 
delegated authority to administrators. Stack, supra note 9, at 1994-95; see also Wendy E. 
Wagner, Essay, A Placefar Ageng Expertise: R.econcilingAgeng Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2060 (2015) (observing that Professor Strauss is "leading the parade" 
of "institutional architects" who have thought about how to structure presidential oversight 
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distinction between the President as an overseer and decider resonates well 
with the tenor of recent presidential politics. After all, President George W. 
Bush famously portrayed himself as "the decider" atop the Executive 
Branch.12 Even though then-Senator Barack Obama, as a presidential 
candidate, spoke more deferentially about the extent of Presidents' 
executive authority, over the course of his administration President Obama 
also exhibited a strong commitment to presidential control over executive 
branch agencies. 13 Consider only a few of President Obama's actions: 
• Toward the end of his first term in office, President Obama
surprised environmentalists-not to mention, apparently, the EPA
Administrator 1 4-by opposing the promulgation of new ozone air
quality standards, a proposal which the EPA promptly withdrew.15
of agency experts). Still earlier scholarship, of course, expresses a similar understanding of 
the law. See, e.g., Reginald Parker, The Removal Power of the Presi.dent and Independent 
Administrative Agencies, "36 IND. L. REV. 63, 64 (1960) (noting that when "a statute vests 
functions in an administrative body or officer other than the President, that agency and not 
the President is the bearer of the powers concerned"). 
12. In a widely reported news conference held in April 2006, President Bush declared:
"I listen to all voices, but mine is the final decision . . . I read the front page, and I know the 
speculation. But I'm the decider, and I decide what is best." Bush: 'I'm the Decider' on 
Rumsftld, CNN (Apr. 18, 2006), http:/ /www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/ 04/18/ 
rumsfeld/. 
13. On the campaign trail in 2008, then-candidate Obama said during a town hall
dialogue in Lancaster, Pennsylvania: "I taught constitutional law for ten years. I take the 
Constitution very seriously. The biggest problems that [we're] facing right now have to do 
with George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the Executive Branch and not 
go through Congress at all, and that's what I intend to reverse when I'm President of the 
United States of America." Obama 2008: Bypassing Congress Unconstitutional; I'll Reverse It, 
YoUTuBE (Feb. 13, 2014), https://youtu.be/a31Wq3CXHyc; Mike Miller, Obama in 2008: 
'I Intend to Reverse' George Bush's Power Grab, Work with Congress, INDEP. J. REV. (2013), 
http://www.ijreview.com/20 l 4/02/ 114994-obama-2008-intend-reverse-george-bushs­
power-grab/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
14. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Re-election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on Smog, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2011 ), http: I /www.nytimes.com/2011 / 11 / 17 /science/earth/policy-and-politics­
collide-as-obama-enters-campaign-mode.html (indicating that EPA Administrator Lisa 
Jackson "did not see coming . . .  a rare public rebuke [by] the president"). 
15. See Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson, Administrator of the EPA, (Sept. 2, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/ default/files/ ozone_national_ambient_air_quality _stan 
dards_letter.pdf ("The President has instructed me to return this rule to you for 
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• Using the slogan "We Can't Wait," the Obama Administration
widely touted its executive efforts to promote job growth following
the Great Recession, instead of waiting "for an increasingly
dysfunctional Congress to do its job." 16 
• When the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) faced
controversy over whether employer health coverage under the
Affordable Care Act should be required to cover contraceptives,
the President delivered a major announcement from the White
House about what HHS would do.17
• In late 2014, President Obama announced controversial
immigration reforms that he claimed to "have the legal authority to
take as President," but which, according to Republican members of
Congress, exceeded his legal authority. IS
Throughout his second term, President Obama time and again publicly 
declared that he had a "pen" and a "phone," a mantra aimed at conveying 
that he was willing to take policy action even in the face of congressional 
inaction and stalemate.19 The Obama Administration, in short, was no 
reconsideration. He has made it clear that he does not support finalizing the rule at this 
time."). For further discussion, see infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
16. We Can't Wait, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/
jobs/we-cant-wait (last visited Oct. 4, 2016); see also Cary Coglianese & Christopher 
Carrigan, The Jobs and Regulation Debate, in DOES REGUIATION KlLl. JOBS? 5-6 (Cary 
Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, & Christopher Carrigan eds., 2013) (describing some of 
President Obama's executive actions intended to stimulate employment growth). 
17. See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Preventive Care, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Feb. 10, 2012, 12: 15 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/l 0/ 
remarks-president-preventive-care. 
18. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Natwn on Immigration, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/l l /  
20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration. For criticism of these reforms by 
Republican members of Congress, see, for example, Seung Min Kim, Senate GOP files Supreme 
Court brief against Obama's immigration actions, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2016, 7:58 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/ story /2016/04/ senate-gop-supreme-court-obama-immigration-
221536. 
19. President Obama has said, "I am going to be working with Congress where I can
to accomplish this, but I am also going to act on my own if Congress is deadlocked . . .  I've 
got a pen to take executive actions where Congress won't, and I've got a telephone to rally 
folks around the country on this mission." Tamara Keith, Wielding a Pen and a Phone, Obama 
Goes it Alone, NPR (Jan. 20, 2014, 3:36 AM), http:/ /www.npr.org/2014/01/20/ 
263766043/wielding-a-pen-and-a-phone-obama-goes-it-alone. For additional examples of 
presidential assertion of authority over agencies in Obama Administration initiatives 
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exception to the modern trend toward an "administrative presidency,"20 
and early actions by President Donald Trump signal that exertions of 
presidential authority over administrative agencies will continue-if not 
even be taken to new extremes.21 Subsequent presidencies are unlikely to 
step back from active presidential interest and involvement in the work of 
administrative agencies, ensuring that the legal limits constraining 
presidents in their efforts to influence the administrative state will remain 
among administrative law's most vital questions. 
Although presidents from both parties have repeatedly engaged in what 
looks like, to any reasonable outside observer, clear decisional control over 
actions taken by appointees, they manage rather easily to honor any 
concerning gun violence and the implementation of health care reform, see Bagley, supra 
note 2; Eric Bradner & Gregory Krieg, Emotional Obama Calls for 'Sense of Urgeng' to Fight Gun 
Violence, CNN Oan. 5, 2016, 8:17 PM), http:/ /www.cnn.com/2016/0 l /05/politics/obama­
executive-action-gun-control/. 
20. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, 1ne Administrative President, REGBLOG Oan. 21, 2013),
http:/ /www.regblog.org/2013/0 l/21-coglianese-administrative-president.html. The term 
"administrative presidency" dates back forty years to the work of political scientist Richard 
Nathan, who argued that Presidents significantly influence domestic policy by focusing their 
efforts on shaping the direction of bureaucratic action. See Richard P. Nathan, 7he 
"Administrative Presidency," 44 PuB. INTEREST 40, 40 (1976). See general� RICHARD P. NATHAN, 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). 
21. In his acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention, candidate
Trump stated notably that he alone could fix the nation's problems, providing one indication 
of his support for a strong, unitary vision of presidential power. See, e.g., Yoni Appelbaum, 'I 
Alone Can Fix It', THE ATLANTIC Ouly 21, 2016), http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2016/07 /trump-rnc-speech-alone-fix-it/492557 /. In just the first week 
following his inauguration, President Trump issued a series of executive directives aimed at 
administrative agencies on topics including climate change, health care insurance, and 
immigration, raising serious public alarm over his quick embrace of command-style 
authority, sometimes without even any serious review and input from officials at the relevant 
agencies. See, e.g., Peter Balcer, Travelers Stranded and Protests Swell Over Trump Order, N. Y. 
TIMES Oan. 29, 2017), https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017 /0 l /29/us/politics/white-house­
official-in-reversal-says-green-card-holders-wont-be-barred.html; Henry F. Carey, Sultan 
Donald Trump? How the President Places Himself Above the Law, NEWSWEEK Oan. 29, 201 7, 11: l 0 
AM), http://www.newsweek.com/ sultan-donald-trump-president-above-law-548680; 
Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, How Trump's Rush to Enact an Immigration Ban Unleashed Global 
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES Oan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 /0 l /29/us/politics/ 
donald-trump-rush-immigration-order-chaos.html; Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilpern, Trump 
Administration Backs Off Plan to Scrub Climate Pages from EPA Website, WASH. POST Oan. 25, 
2017), https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017 /01/25/ 
trump-administration-backs-off-plan-to-scrub-climate-pages-from-epa-website/. 
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purported decisional limits on their authority over agencies. The ability of 
presidents to comply with such an asserted limit on directive authority, 
while simultaneously still effectively controlling their political appointees, 
reveals a major weakness in any argument for placing a decisional limit on 
presidential control. The kind of overseer-decider distinction that 
demarcates such a limit is in actuality quite easy for Presidents to hono� 
while still permitting them effective decisional control over agency action. 
The overseer-decider distinction is both unclear in application and 
unenforceable, making it, as a practical matter, of virtually no consequence 
in the everyday power struggles between the White House and 
administrative agencies. 22 Even assuming the distinction could be sustained 
as a matter of constitutional interpretation, it is hard to imagine the 
judiciary enforcing it. Presidents can readily achieve their goals-and in 
that sense function as deciders-without ever crossing the amorphous 
decisional line in the sand. 
Recognizing that an attempt to impose a decisional limit on presidential 
control only tilts at windmills does not deny that law in general can affect 
behavior, nor need it signal any retreat from administrative law's core 
aspiration to "succeed in applying the constraints of law to the world of 
politics."23 Such recognition also does not dispute that Congress can 
authorize only administrators, and not presidents, to take governmental 
action.24 Rather, the very important need for effective administrative law 
and statutory limits on governing authority itself provides a key reason to 
resist the current way that a decisional limit on presidential authority has 
been conceived. The murkiness of a purported overseer-decider 
22. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 25 ("In practice ... the distinction between
presidential influence and command might be thin indeed."). 
23. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 713.
24. To be clear, I do not take issue here with the idea that there can be legal limits on
presidential involvement in domestic policy matters, especially when matters have been 
expressly delegated to agencies. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 637 (1952) Gackson,J., concurring) (''When the President takes measures incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb."). For 
example, as I discuss further in Part IV, I assume that presidents cannot fire cabinet officials 
and then start to sign rule documents or take other actions themselves when the statutory 
authority for such action rests with the cabinet officials, not with the President. Rather, my 
focus here is on the form of the limit being conventionally based on some decisional essence, 
drawn on the basis of a completely opaque line between "overseeing " and "deciding." 
Hence, I refer throughout to my target as "decisional limits." In Part IV, I introduce the 
more promising way to draw the limit, based on a formalist, bright-line rule about whose 
signature is required to effectuate administrative action. 
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distinction not only makes this decisional limit ineffectual, but it also makes 
entirely foreseeable that partisans will mask their ideological objections as 
legal ones-thus weakening, rather than strengthening, the legitimacy of 
law. The incomprehensibility of an overseer-decider limit makes it weak as 
a matter of law, which, within an intensely political climate, actually risks 
undermining administrative law by unnecessarily politicizing claims about 
it and thereby also diminishing the respect the law needs to help to sustain 
its behavioral force.25 Precisely because it is anybody's guess where the line 
between permissible oversight and impermissible decisionmaking lies, 
Republicans will continue to criticize Democratic presidents for crossing 
the line-as they vociferously did when Barack Obama was President­
while Democrats will continue to criticize Republicans-as they did 
vociferously when George W. Bush was President. 26 When House Speaker 
John Boehner reminded President Obama that, in addition to a pen and a 
phone, "he also has a Constitution and an oath of office that he took,"27 the 
Speaker sounded much like Democrats did during the Bush 
Administration, a time when Republicans were largely silent about 
presidential control.28 When a legal doctrine so predictably becomes 
invoked in partisan ways, the Constitution comes to serve as a rhetorical 
football in a highly polarized ideological game. The law's legitimacy, in 
turn, suffers. 29 
Of course, the risk of political exploitation of malleable legal principles 
can never be avoided altogether. In certain areas of law, and even on other 
questions of administrative law, such a risk should be taken-at least where 
25. See Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separati.on of Powers Legi,timag: An Empirical 
Inquiry of Norms of Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1871 (2016) (reporting empirical 
research indicating that the invocation of an overseei-decider standard in situations 
involving presidential involvement in administrative affairs diminishes public legitimacy over 
legal decisions); see also James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Testing Positivity Theory: 
What Roles do Politicization and Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court 
Legitimacy? 5 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that the Supreme Court suffers a loss 
oflegitimacy when it becomes "politicized") (on file with author). 
26. For a general discussion of differing reactions in the Bush and Obama years, see
Cary Coglianese, Presidmtial Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over Law or Politics?, 12 U. 
PA.j. CONST. L 637, 643-44 (2010). 
27. Keith, supra note 19.
28. Many Republicans appear to have returned to silence yet again in the opening
days of the Trump Administration. See, e.g., Russell Berman, Congressional Republicans Sudden[y 
Lose Interest in Executive Overreach, THE ATLANTIC Gan. 26, 2017), https:/ /www.theatlantic. 
com/politics/ archive/20 I 7 /0 I/ republicans-trump-executive-orders/ 51454 7 /. 
29. See Coglianese & Firth, supra note 25, at 1908-09.
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there are realistic chances that an otherwise plastic standard might yield 
some beneficial behavioral effects. 30 Yet when the conceptual basis for a 
legal distinction is far from clear (as I will show in Part I of this Article is the 
case with decisional limits), and where there is no evident counteivailing 
practical or legal value to that distinction, it would be better to abandon the 
reliance on it as a source oflaw. This is especially so when such a murky 
distinction would be invoked in a context that is highly politicized, as inter­
branch disputes inevitably are. 31 
Disavowing the overseer-decider distinction as a matter of law, which I 
argue lawyers and legal scholars should do, does not render critics of 
presidential overreach mute; political protest and moral criticism will 
always remain. 32 As for the law, the better and more meaningful approach 
to presidential overreach is to embrace a highly formalistic doctrine, one 
not as prone to ideological contamination and one which still seives the 
broader purposes underlying the dysfunctional overseer-decider distinction. 
Such a solution lies with a bright-line rule based on the formal signing of 
documents, an approach which adherents of decisional limits presumably 
already accept and yet which offers considerable advantage in terms of 
clarity and an ability to resist unhelpful politicization and the weakening of 
law's legitimacy. 33 In the end, legal protection against presidential 
overreach may well never be entirely sufficient, but the best doctrinal 
approach in this setting will not come from incoherent decisional limits; 
rather, it will take the form of a clear, formal rule that demands that each 
administrator signs off, literally, on all agency actions delegated to that 
official. 
30. The balancing test used in procedural due process analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), comes to mind as a possible example where a standard (rather 
than a rule) could be beneficial. 
31. For concerns similar to those expressed in this Article about decisional limits on
presidential directive authority, formal rules would tend to be preferable to more malleable 
standards when applied to separation-of-powers questions more generally. CJ. Andrew Coan 
& Nicholas Bullard, Judicial CapaciD' and Executive Power, l 02 VA. L. REv. 765, 807 (2016) ("In 
high-stakes and high-volume domains, capacity limits constrain a Court motivated to 
enforce constitutional limits to do so in the form of categorical rules that cleanly insulate 
most government action from constitutional challenge."). 
32. Sometimes these political and moral objections may even be based on strong
norms that, even if not legally binding, are nevertheless viewed by government officials as 
obligatory. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Conventwns ef Ageng Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1163, 1189-94 (2013). 
33. See irifra Part IV.
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I. WHAT DOES A DECISIONAL LIMIT MEAN?
No one disputes that the President serves as the head of the Executive 
Branch, and no one seriously argues that a president is above the law. In 
the realm of "ordinary" or "conventional" administration of domestic 
affairs, Presidents are as bound as anyone to adhere to federal statutes. 34 
But when Congress grants authority to an administrative agency to take 
governmental action, does that mean the agency head alone decides 
whether and how to take that action? Or does a grant to an agency within 
the Executive Branch imply that the agency must exercise its statutory 
responsibility subject to presidential supervision? Actions carried out by 
subordinate officials do, after all, fall under the President's leadership and 
constitutional responsibility, and the public will hold presidents accountable 
for actions of subordinate officials. 35 But as a legal matter, what does 
presidential "control" of administrative action mean? What is the precise 
nature and scope of a president's permissible influence over the Executive 
Branch on domestic policy matters? 
These are the motivating questions underlying a long tradition of legal 
scholarship in administrative law. For many scholars, the answers to these 
questions hinge on something like the overseer-decider distinction that 
Professor Strauss has so expressively advanced. As the one official 
constitutionally vested with "the executive power" of the federal 
government, the President clearly has a role to play supervising the 
Executive Branch, if for no reason other than to ensure that laws are 
"faithfully executed." 36 But when a statute expressly grants an 
administrative agency the authority to act, the President's role must be 
limited, according to the standard view, to "that of overseer and not 
decider. "37 
34. The quoted adjectives are from Peter Strauss, Overseer.or Decider?, supra note 11, at
708-09. Like Strauss, I am focused on situations in which Congress has assigned a duty or
granted authority to an agency, but where the agency still has discretion in how it acts. Such
discretionary responsibilities can be distinguished from what the Supreme Court has called
"ministerial" duties. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610
(1838). They can also be distinguished from actions that are purely discretionary or
political. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803). I am chiefly
concerned with the actions in between the ministerial and discretionary extremes, or what
Professor Strauss has aptly called "the vast middle ground that is the home of administrative
law." Strauss, Presidential Ru/emaking, supra note 11, at 977.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3; see also Coglianese & Firth, supra note 25, at 1873.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II,§§ I, 3 (emphasis added).
3 7. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 705.
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The argument for such a decision-based distinction appears to be 
grounded in constitutional interpretation, statutory interpretation, and a 
normative concern about the accumulation of power in the presidency. 
The principal constitutional argument calls attention to two provisions­
one each in Articles One and Two of the Constitution-that acknowledge 
that officials other than Presidents have their own "duties. "38 The statutory 
argument follows an expressio unius logic: by authorizing specific secretaries 
or administrators to act, statutes should be read to exclude authorization to 
presidents because Congress could have (and sometimes has) granted 
decisional authority to presidents instead.39 Limiting the presidential role to 
oversight when statutes only authorize agency action also purportedly 
protects against presidents wielding "unchecked individual power," as 
agency administrators retain ultimate-and in principle, independent­
decisionmaking authority. 40 True, Presidents can still remove 
administrators, but removal and the process of confirming a replacement 
imposes political costs that serve to constrain that exercise of presidential 
power.41 
What should we make of the argument for a decisional limit? For many 
observers, its persuasiveness probably depends, in the first instance, on their 
views of the optimal configuration of presidential power, normatively and 
constitutionally, in relation to the other branches of government.42 I take 
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (noting, with regard to "the executive Departments," the
"Duties of their respective Offices''); id. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power "to make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" both the enumerated 
legislative powers as well as "all other Powers vested ... in any Department or Officer"). 
39. See Kagan, supra note 5, at 2328 (noting reliance by those who deny general
presidential directive authority on "the hoary principle of 'expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius'-to include one thing is to exclude another-to justify the equation of silence with 
denial"). For an influential argument against presumptive directive authority that relies on 
the fact that Congress has sometimes expressly given decisional and directional authority to 
the President, see Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers lo Administer the IAws, l 06 
COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006). 
40. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 7 59.
41. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 40, at 295 ("Firing typically has a much higher political
cost to the President than (successfully) directing an official's exercise of discretion."). Some 
scholars have even suggested that the political constraints on presidential overreach are 
greater than any provided by law. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 15 (20 I 0) (arguing that "law does little to constrain the modem 
executive ... whereas politics and public opinion do constrain the modem executive"). 
42. For contrasting normative views of presidential power, compare, for example,
ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 4 (describing a powerful presidency as "a serious threat to our 
constitutional tradition"), with, for example, WILLIAM G. HOWELL & TERRY M. MOE, 
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no position here on that broader normative debate; rather, I want to focus 
attention on whether distinguishing between deciding and overseeing can serve 
as any meaningful legal constraint on presidential power. In other words, I 
accept for analysis the underlying assumption of those who argue for a 
decisional limit, namely that presidential control of the administrative state 
should be constrained. I am interested in whether a decisional limit can 
realistically help to achieve whatever level of presidential authority might 
be optimal. If the proper calibration of authority depends on presidents 
acting as overseers rather than decisionmakers, then we should examine 
carefully what that distinction means and how it might possibly work. 
I begin this analysis by noting the semantic and conceptual plasticity of a 
decisional limit. Under the prevailing argument for such a limit, presidents 
may properly take action that can be described by a broad range of verbs. 
For example, presidents may permissibly "supervise," 43 "guide," 44 
"consult,"45 "coordinate,"46 and engage in "oversight"47 of other officials in 
the Executive Branch. When those other officials are exercising discretion 
afforded to them by statute, however, presidents purportedly may not 
"direct," 48 "command," 49 "control," 50 "decide," 51 or engage in 
"policymaking."52 Yet as this variety of terms shows, the distinction
embedded in a decisional limit is far from self-evident. In ordinary 
discourse, outside the context of presidential-agency relations, some of the 
terms used for permissible conduct are synonymous with, or at least entail, 
the very terms used to characterize impermissible conduct. Overseers also 
direct, as they often do when they serve on corporate boards of directors. 
Mountain climbing guides make decisions for the clients in their care. In 
almost every organization of any size, superoisors issue commands. Indeed, 
supervisors would presumably not be doing their jobs if they were not 
RELIC: How OUR CONSTITUTION UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND WHY WE 
NEED A MORE POWERFUL PRESIDENCY (2016) (advancing reform agenda "that moves 
presidents to the center of the policy process"). 
43. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 709 n.66, 718.
44. Id. at 709 n.66.
45. Id. at 7 I 2, 717, 737-38.
46. Id. at 717-18.
47. Id. at 709 n.66, 712, 737, 759; see also id. at 697, 759 ("oversee").
48. Id. at 709 n.66.
49. Id. at 709 n.66, 712, 715, 738, 757.
50. Id. at 702, 718, 728, 7 52. But see id. at 709 n.66 (suggesting that when control is
only "general" it might sometimes differ from directing or deciding). 
51. Id. at 709 n.66; see also id. at 7 40 ("decisions").
52. Id at 737.
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trying to direct and control. Consider supervisors who tell their cleaning staffs 
to "scrub the floors"; they have decided that the floors should be clear.ed and 
that such cleaning will take priority over other tasks. 
If the actual language characterizing overseers and deciders is itself far 
from clear, it is hard to see how anyone can know whether a president is 
acting properly.53 One person's responsible, proactive presidential overseer 
will be another person's meddling, overbearing decider. The distinction is 
further complicated by the fact that political appointees may be already 
inclined to take many actions fully consistent with their President's 
preferences. In cases of agreement between administrators and presidents, 
the oversee�decider distinction underlying an alleged decisional limit 
makes no difference whatsoever. No matter how overbearing they may be, 
supervisors who tell their custodial staffs to scrub the floors have not 
become the deciders when their staffs already planned to complete this task 
anyway. 
Another complication is that presidents can also get their way merely 
through consultation. Administrators may choose to follow their 
President's wishes after White House staff members provide substantively 
persuasive information. When administrators are simply persuaded by 
presidents that following their wishes is the best course of action for 
advancing their agencies' respective missions and the overall public interest, 
the oversee�decider distinction again does not matter. Whatever it may 
actually mean for a president to be a decider, providing information or 
expressing a view is not the same as making the decision.54 This is 
significant because, as political scientist Richard Neustadt noted long ago, 
much of what in reality constitutes presidential power amounts to the 
power to persuade. 55 
Adherents of decisional limits do, of course, recognize that Presidents 
can still get their way by acting as overseers. What, then, could they 
possibly have in mind by distinguishing oversight from decisionmaki,ng? 
Perhaps Presidents become deciders when they persuade their political 
53. Others have called attention to similar line-drawing difficulties concerning
influences on official decisionmaking in other contexts, such as with decisionmaking by 
prosecutors. See, e.g., Sara S. Beale, Rethinking the Identi� and Role of United States AttomtD's, 6 
OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 369, 414 n.257 (2009). For empirical evidence showing the difficulties 
of discerning decisionmaking, see Coglianese & Firth, supra note 25, at 1883-87, 1903-05. 
54. See Sierra Club v. Castle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (distinguishing the
mere existence of a face-to-face meeting between the President and EPA officials from an 
"effort to base the [EPA] rule on any 'information or data' arising from that meeting"). 
55. See general!, RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN
PRFBIDENTS (1980). 
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appointees, not by providing information and reasons, but by resorting to 
making threats or promises of rewards. 56 Threats-whether express or 
implied-could conceivably encompass a broad range of negative 
consequences, including refusing to support appointees on policy issues or 
on budgetary negotiations with Congress, leaking negative news about 
appointees, and outright dismissing them (or, more likely, demanding their 
resignation). Rewards plausibly include inviting the appointees to White 
House events and photo-ops, supporting them on policy issues important to 
appointees, augmenting budgetary requests, and even providing future 
assurances of political support after appointees leave the administration. 
But if the mere availability of threats and rewards is what distinguishes 
deciders from overseers, then that criterion sweeps far too broadly. 
Rewards and threats are incentives, and incentives are essential parts of all 
principals' efforts to oversee their agents.57 The mere fact that Presidents can 
deploy incentives seems hardly enough, by itself, to make a President "the 
decider." 
Admittedly, one could imagine a President engaging in unseemly and 
decidedly repugnant threats, such as bribery or blackmail-incentives that 
would clearly go out of bounds. If a President were to threaten punitive 
measures sufficient to place an administrator under duress, such as 
threatening an administrator with serious bodily harm, then that President 
would have crossed a sacrosanct line. But the line would not be the 
oversee.decider line. The President would have crossed the line 
demarcating criminal conduct from lawful behavior, a line that has been 
properly drawn for reasons entirely independent of the concerns underlying 
the debate over presidential directives. The oversee.decider distinction 
would not be doing any of the conceptual or normative work in such an 
instance. If it means anything at all, the oversee.decider distinction 
addresses a debate over presidential orders-not violence. 
Outside of criminal acts, the threat to remove an agency head is 
probably the most serious threat that any president can wield in the 
56. For analytic purposes, the difference between a threat and a reward is not crucial
here. Indeed, the promise of a reward could be viewed simply as a special kind of threat, 
namely a threat that, if the appointee does not act in a certain way, the reward will be 
denied. Cognitively, of course, people do react somewhat differently to a loss of something 
they currently possess than the denial of a comparable gain. 
5 7. For a discussion of principal-agent relationships, including the role of incentives in 
managing these relationships, see generally John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Principals and Agents: An Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENfS: THE STRUCTlJRE OF BUSINESS 
(1985). 
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administrative context. 58 But surely even a threat of removal would never 
place an administrator under the level of coercion necessary to establish 
that the President effectively had become the decider. Removal hardly rises 
to the level of duress in criminal law, which usually requires a threat of 
death or "grievous bodily injury."59 Quite the contrary, not only do courts 
accept Presidents' removal authority, but such power is often thought to be 
a desirable mechanism for channeling presidential control of administrators 
by those who think Presidents should not become deciders. 60 Professor 
Strauss, who otherwise advocates a decisional limit on presidential 
involvement in administrative matters, nevertheless accepts that "the 
President could assure the faithful execution of the laws . . . through 
removal of one who failed to follow his directions. "61 Whatever it is that 
might make any president the decider must therefore be something other 
than the nature of the incentives wielded by the President. 
Perhaps the overseer-decider distinction hinges instead on 
administrators' motivations for deferring to presidential preferences against 
their own. If an administrator was motivated by a president's preferences or 
actions rather than by the substantive, policy merits implicated by the 
action to be taken, then maybe that would make the President the decider. 
58. Removal is a serious threat in that it directly affects an appointee's employment
and pursuit of professional or policy goals. That said, given the costs to the President of 
removal, in terms of needing to secure Senate confirmation for a replacement, in practice 
such threats will likely have limited credibility to them. Cf Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and 
the Presidency: 'flze Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (1997) 
(arguing that "the power to remove has limited real-world significance"). 
59. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for Its Proper limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1340-41 (1989) (explaining that "death and 
grievous bodily injury are the only two types of threatened harm that unambiguously 
exculpate a coerced actor"). In the criminal law context, even when a defendant faces a 
mortal threat, the excuse of duress does not negate the defendant's agency; rather, it remains 
the case that "the coerced actor chooses to violate the law." Id. at 1359-60. It would clearly 
be inconsistent to treat Presidential threats far less serious than those needed to meet the test 
of duress in the criminal law as nevertheless sufficient to do what even the excuse of duress 
does not do, namely to negate agency, and thereby to make the President the decider rather 
than the coerced administrator. 
60. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 134 (1926) ("The imperative reasons
requiring an unrestricted power [for the President] to remove the most important of his 
subordinates."). 
61. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 705--06. If the threat of removal were
deemed to create a condition of true duress, Professor Strauss would certainly not have 
emphasized that "The right to remove and the authority to decide are not to be conflated." 
Id. at 708. 
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Yet if the overseer-decider distinction hinges on what goes on inside the 
head of an administrator, this all but guarantees that the overseer-decider 
distinction will have no practical consequence, as motivations cannot be 
observed and they can be easily masked. Furthermore, since at least the 
Morgan litigation of the late 1930s, courts have noted that in reviewing 
administrative action "it is not the function of the court to probe the mental 
processes of [administrators]. "62 In Citizens to Prescroe Overton Park v. Volpe, 63 
the Supreme Court affirmed that "inquiry into the mental processes of 
administrative decisionmakers is usually to be avoided" absent "a strong 
showing of bad faith or improper behavior."64 The D.C. Circuit Court, in 
Sierra Club v. Costle,65 noted that "presidential prodding" might affect agency 
decisions but "in a way the courts could not police."66 
Even if the motivational effects of presidential prodding could be 
observed and policed, undoubtedly what would be observed most often 
would be a variety of rather benign, possibly even laudable, motivations for 
administrators to follow their Presidents. Political appointees who feel 
personal loyalty toward their Presidents, perhaps even out of gratitude for 
their appointments, naturally can be expected to respond to presidential 
requests or expressions of preference. 67 An administrator might also accept 
a moral obligation to defer to the President because of a principled belief 
that the President holds greater democratic accountability, having won a 
national election that the administrator did not. 68 Presidents who elicit 
loyalty and gratitude, however, are not necessarily deciders. "There is a 
difference," Professor Strauss has aptly observed, "between ordinary 
respect and political deference, on the one hand, and law-compelled 
obedience, on the other."69 
It is this notion of "law compelled obedience" that in the end appears to 
be the only plausible conceptual basis for the overseer-decider distinction. 
Namely, the idea that a president's order to an administrator legal!, 
62. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. I, 18 (1938); see United States v. Morgan, 313
U.S. 409,422 (1941) (noting that the "integrity" and "independence" of the administrative 
process must be respected by not subjecting administrators to judicial questioning). 
63. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
64. Id. at 420.
65. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
66. Overton Park, 40 I U.S. at 408.
67. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note I I, at 702.
68. CJ Kagan, supra note 5, at 2334 (noting that Presidents "are the only
governmental officials elected by a national constituency in votes focused on general, rather 
than local, policy issues"). 
69. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 704.
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obligates that administrator to follow it, simply because it comes from the 
President, even though the administrator exercises authority expressly 
delegated to the administrator by statute. It is that notion of legal duty that 
the debate over presidential directive authority ultimately implicates. But 
what does the notion of legal duty provide by way of demarcating 
permissible oversight activity by a President and impermissible 
decisionmaking? It would seem that if the President orders the head of an 
agency to take action, and the agency head has a legal duty to obey, then 
the President has presumably become the decider in the eyes of the law. Of 
course, such a view of what makes a president a decider is circular; it begs 
the question of what constitutes a legally binding presidential order. 70 The 
answer, presumably, would be any order that makes the President the 
decider, not an overseer. But if acting as a decider is not lawful, then there 
can never be an order that imposes any such legal obligation and thus 
would violate the decisional limit. The overseer-decider distinction, in 
other words, still performs no meaningful conceptual work in defining limits 
on presidential authority. 
Rather than providing a justification for a decisional limit, any 
invocation of the notion of law-compelled obedience to distinguish between 
permissible presidential oversight and impermissible decisionmaking is at 
best merely another way of restating a conclusion that presidential orders 
do not impose legal obligations on the heads of agencies. It does not 
advance our understanding of what presidential actions would exceed a 
decisional limit. Vv e can, then, move past the conceptual emptiness of the 
overseer-decider distinction and instead explore what leverage the notion 
of law-compelled obedience might provide in practice in seeking to place 
limits on presidential control. 
70. Some readers may be prompted to entertain weighty jurisprudential questions
about the essence of law and what distinguishes it from other kinds of social norms and other 
factors shaping human behavior. Such questions are important but are broader than my 
point here. My claim is not about the essence of law but rather about the value of relying 
on a distinction between oversight and decision given the inherent conceptual difficulty of 
drawing any meaningful line. In that regard, the question begged by invoking law­
compelled obedience is still the question of what distinguishes oversight from decision. 
Under the conventional decisional-limit account, Presidents who decide create no legal duty 
for administrators to obey, while Presidents who oversee also create no legal duty to obey. 
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II. DECISIONAL LIMITS IN PRACTICE
A legal obligation is often taken to mean a duty enforceable by a court. 11
Yet I do not read anyone in the debate over directive authority to suggest 
seriously that the courts should step in to enforce presidential directives. It 
would be a remarkable intrusion of the Judicial Branch into the inner 
workings of the Executive Branch if presidents were to seek and be able to 
obtain court orders compelling their own subordinates to follow 
presidential orders. For this reason, courts would almost certainly eschew 
intervening on behalf of a president in order to compel an appointed officer 
to do what the President had ordered. More fundamentally, why would a 
president ever pursue such litigation in the first place?72 Seeking a judicial 
remedy would only make a president look weak-if not downright, well, 
silly. 
Presidents also need not go to the trouble and time to seek a judicial 
order-assuming it could even be obtained-because they can just remove 
recalcitrant subordinates. 73 Presidents who might even begin to 
contemplate suing their own appointees have already surely lost enough 
confidence in those individuals and their loyalty to want to keep them in 
office. Moreover, judicial action would likely prove to be a seriously 
unattractive practical remedy for Presidents in such circumstances. 
Litigation would take much longer to yield any outcome than would an 
outright dismissal, and any outcome would be uncertain, as the President 
could still lose in court. Suing one's own subordinate would also 
71. For a recent comprehensive argument that law inherently depends on the
enforceability of norms, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015). 
72. Private litigation is not, as a practical matter, any meaningful source of constraint.
Most executive orders specifically disavow the creation of any judicially enforceable right. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence on executive orders confirms the absence of judicial 
intervention. According to the most comprehensive study, at most only about 1 % of all 
executive orders issued from 1942 to 1998 had ever been subjected to any judicial challenge, 
with the President's order affirmed 83% of the time. See WIWA\1 HOWELL, POWER 
WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 154, fig. 7 .2 
(2003). Moreover, these cases raised issues other than the ones about administrative 
obedience or decisional limits that are relevant here. 
73. This is the case for most administrators of executive agencies. BREGER & EDLES,
supra note 3. It is not so clearly the case for administrators for whom removal is subject to a 
showing of good cause. To the extent that removal is conditioned upon such a showing, a 
legal issue could conceivably arise over whether an administrator's mere failure to follow a 
presidential order provides a President with sufficient cause to remove. If litigated, a court 
might be confronted in this context with the question of whether such an administrator 
faced a legal duty to obey a presidential order. 
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undoubtedly generate political costs for a president not dissimilar to those 
of removing an official altogether. 74 For all of these practical reasons, if no 
others, it should be clear that in this context law-compelled obedience 
cannot be taken to mean court-compelled obedience. 
Yet even if the notion of a legal duty in this context does not imply any 
realistic judicial remedy, perhaps legal duty here still matters if it means 
that adherence to a presidential order provides an agency with a reason for 
74. It has been suggested that if an agency issues a rule when the President has
ordered it not to, that the rule is ultra vires and cannot be enforced by the courts against 
private entities. David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and Presidenti.al Control of Executive 
Branch Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 309, 320 n.61 (1993). Again, it is hard to imagine a 
president tolerating what would in all likelihood be a quite open defiance of an executive 
order. A formal executive order is a last resort. If a president (or more realistically, a 
member of his White House staff) has tried making phone calls, holding meetings in the 
Oval Office, or other less formal means to get an administrator to retreat from a rule, and if 
the administrator is still sufficiently defiant that the President feels compelled to issue an 
executive order and hope the courts will accept an ultra vires claim, then the President must 
necessarily feel strongly that a rule should not be issued. If the President feels so strongly, 
then why not just remove the defiant administrator instead of taking a chance on what the 
courts may or may not decide? Indeed, the administrator would likely feel compelled to 
resign-or the President might ask for resignation rather than removal. As a thought 
experiment, the reader might wish to consider what would have happened had EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson decided to issue ozone standards in 2011 in the face of public 
opposition by President Obama to the agency doing so. See supra notes 14-15; irifra notes 
95-10 I and accompanying text.
Now, it could be supposed that situations may arise where an administrator agrees with
a President that a rule should not be issued, but the administrator faces a clear statutory 
obligation to issue the rule. Imagine a statute like the Clean Air Act that says the 
administrator must issue a rule when it finds doing so to be necessary to protect public 
health, but where the President orders the administrator to adopt rules only with positive net 
benefits shown by an economic analysis estimating both public health benefits and costs to 
industry. Assume the administrator finds that a particular rule is required to meet public 
health protection as directed in the statute, even though the rule's costs would be far greater 
than the health benefits. The administrator may well agree with the President that it would 
be better not to issue the rule, but the administrator may also correctly conclude that the 
statutory provision requires the adoption of the rule. If the administrator were to defy a 
presidential order and issue the rule, a court finding in such a case that the rule was ultra 
vires owing to the presidential order would also necessarily come into direct conflict with the 
terms of a statute. A presidential order cannot give a president authority to invalidate rules 
that administrators have a statutory obligation to adopt. Any revocation of a rule under 
such circumstances would therefore presumably be itself ultra vires. In reality, of course, an 
administrator will in all likelihood resign or be fired before creating such a predicament over 
any politically salient policy. 
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its action that would withstand arbitrary and capricious review under the 
AP A. 75 After all, one might not unreasonably imagine that if the 
Constitution imposes a legal duty on an administrator to obey a presidential 
order over domestic policy matters, then relying on that order should 
certainly provide an agency with a sufficient reason to withstand judicial 
scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious test. 76 Perhaps in this way the 
overseer-decider distinction can effectively be "enforced" by the courts 
exercising arbitrary and capricious review, should they accept presidential 
orders as reasons for agency action. 77 
Despite this possible way that statutory review under the APA relates to 
the question of limits on presidential control, the legal analysis demanded 
by the AP A's arbitrary and capricious test is really aimed at a different 
question altogether: namely, whether an administrator may rely on 
obedience to a presidential order to withstand arbitrary and capricious 
75. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). This view is suggested by a separate opinion by Justice
William Rehnquist in the State Farm case, where he argued that a change in the occupant of 
the White House would provide "a perfectly reasonable basis" for an agency decision. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The State Farm majority did not 
endorse Justice Rehnquist's view, relying instead on a test for the arbitrary and capricious 
standard that emphasized solely expert reasoning about facts, evidence, and technical 
analysis. Id. at 43-46 (majority opinion). For elaboration of courts' emphasis on 
technocratic reasoning by agencies under the arbitrary and capricious standards, see 
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricwus Review, 119 YALE LJ. 5, 
19 (2009) (discussing "how prevalent State Farm's focus on evidence, facts, and expertise has 
become" in judicial decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard);Jody Freeman & 
Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA· From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 97 
(2008) (explaining how the Supreme Court's recent decision in climate change litigation 
affirmed State Farm's emphasis on agency reasoning based on "information, scientific 
uncertainty, and the costs and benefits of acquiring further information" to the exclusion of 
reasoning based on "the President's priorities"). 
76. This is itself a point of some debate among administrative law scholars and judges.
At least a few commentators and jurists could be read to suggest that a presidential order 
provides a sufficient reason to withstand arbitrary and capricious review, although the more 
widely accepted view is that by itself it does not. 
77. For example, Percival suggests that "agency decisions reached at the behest of
White House officials are likely to be more vulnerable to legal challenges [ under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard] than are other regulations because regulatory review [by 
the White House] often emphasizes factors that are not made relevant by the underlying 
regulatory statute." Percival, Mo's in ChargeJ, supra note 10, at 2535. 
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review.78 Considering the import of presidential orders for arbitrary and 
capricious review purposes actually does rather little to answer the broader 
question of how to constrain presidential involvement in agency affairs. 
This is so for at least two reasons. 
First, the answer to the APA question of whether administrative 
obedience provides a sufficiently nonarbitrary justification for agency action 
will depend on what is the exact legal duty created by a presidential order.79
A presidential order could potentially provide a sufficient reason for agency 
action if an administrator has a legal duty to follow that presidential order. 
But presumably, any legal duty in this context would only be for an 
administrator to follow an otherwise lawful order (or to follow only those 
presidential orders that can lawfully be followed). Thus, circularity begins 
to reemerge. Answering the AP A question calls first for answering the 
separate question of whether presidential orders impose legal duties on 
administrators; the AP A does not provide the answer to the latter 
question. 80 We are no farther along in determining when an administrator 
faces a legal duty to follow a presidential order. The APA simply cannot 
help in answering that question. 
Second, because presidents are bound to follow constitutionally valid 
statutes, presidential orders over domestic policy matters cannot trump 
clear statutory provisions.81 Accordingly, it would not be lawful for an 
administrator to rely solely on obedience to a presidential order as a reason 
for action if either a substantive statute or the APA requires something else. 
Where an administrator's discretion is constrained by statute, even 
procedurally, the administrator could be said to owe no duty to follow a 
presidential order if doing so would contravene the statute. As the AP A 
can constrain an administrator just as much as any other substantive 
statute, even an administrator who is obligated to obey a presidential order 
could also be obligated to obey an APA requirement that separate reasons, 
grounded in evidence, be provided to justify agency action. 
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."). 
79. See supra Part I.
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) {Jackson,
J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his 
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter ... 
Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with 
caution."). 
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There is yet another way to see how the question of what constitutes a 
sufficient reason for agency action under the APA is separate from the 
question of what defines the overseer-decider line. Even if we assume that 
a presidential order does not impose on an administrator any legal 
obligation to obey, it still does not necessarily follow that it would be 
arbitrary and capricious for an administrator to justify an action solely on 
the basis of such an order. After all, a presidential order could conceivably 
always provide a reason for an agency action. Consider an agency that must 
choose between two policy alternatives, both having equally sound factual 
support and both falling within the bounds of discretion afforded the 
agency by the statute, but each possesses competing normative arguments. 
If one alternative is favored by the President, then it is hard to see why it 
would be arbitrary for the administrator in such a circumstance to choose 
the alternative supported by the democratically elected President. Such an 
approach might well be quite reasonably grounded on a principled account 
of democracy.s2 
The key takeaway is that the issue of whether a presidential order 
imposes on an administrator a constitutionally based legal duty is neither 
necessarily nor logically resolved by, or dependent upon, the answer to the 
separate question of whether obeying such an order will satisfy a statutorily 
based legal duty that the administrator act reasonably. 83 Determining 
whether a presidential directive imposes a legal obligation on an 
administrator does not necessarily resolve the question of what an 
administrator must do to meet the arbitrary and capricious standard under 
the AP A. Even if a presidential order entails law-compelled obedience, 
there remain strong arguments that it still cannot provide a reason for 
action that meets APA standards; however, there also remain strong 
arguments that a presidential order could provide a sufficient reason, even 
if it does not entail law-compelled obedience.84 The APA, in short, simply 
does not resolve the core issue. The arbitrary and capricious standard 
speaks to the obligation an agency has for justifying its decisions-not 
82. Justice Rehnquist suggested just such a reasoning in his concurrence in Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57-59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that a change in 
presidential administrations is "brought about by the people casting their votes"). 
83. See in.fra note 126.
84. Justice Rehnquist's separate opinion in State Fann, for example, does not hinge on
a conclusion that obedience to a presidential order is legally mandated. State Fann, 463 U.S. 
at 57-59 (Rehnquist,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); See also Watts, supra note 
75, at 32-45 (discussing various benefits for allowing presidential influence to count as a 
justification for agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard). 
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whether it has an obligation to obey a presidential order. The standard is 
intended to ensure that agencies are considering evidence, entertaining 
policy alternatives, and selecting appropriate criteria when reaching their 
decisions.85 It is not intended to cabin presidential authority. 
As a practical matter, taking a firm stance against obedience-as-a-reason 
under the AP A probably offers no more constraint on presidential control 
than does trying to hold the line between decider and overseer. As long as 
what a president is ordering is capable of being defended-that is, as long 
as there are some sensible reasons for it, or at least as long as such reasons 
can be constructed-then requiring reasons beyond obedience provides no 
bulwark against presidential tyranny. To be sure, there may at times be 
some agency decisions where the "real" empirical or existential reason for 
agency action may be political posturing or other self-interested 
motivations, reasons that, if cited by the agency, would not withstand 
judicial muster. It may be that an administrator at times really takes 
certain actions solely because a president tells her to do so. 86 But the 
arbitrary and capricious test does not require the agency to provide true 
psychological explanations as reasons; it demands policy or moral 
justifications, and these can be and are constructed even when 
psychological explanations for agency action might be inadequate by 
themselves for sustainingjudicial review. 
Although this may sound like the arbitrary and capricious test calls for or 
permits deception, it need not be construed as any more unseemly than 
what it takes for judges to fulfill their obligation to provide reasoned 
85. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 4 3  ("An agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, [or] offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency .... "). 
86. Robert Percival acknowledges that "It is extremely rare ...  that parties seeking
judicial review of agency action will be able to prove that the President or his staff overrode 
an agency head's decision." Percival, JiVho's in Charge?, supra note 10, at 2535. But he also 
claims "it is not impossible." Id. In support, he cites an EPA rulemaking that, following 
involvement by the White House Council on Competitiveness, failed to ban incineration of 
lead acid batteries. Percival writes that the Council "was so proud of its rejection of EPA's 
proposed ban on incineration ... that it publicly boasted it had vetoed EPA's decision." Id.
To his credit, Percival acknowledges in a footnote that, when reviewing the EPA action, the 
D.C. Circuit could not determine that the EPA did not make the final decision to reject the
incineration ban. Id. at 2536 n.392. In fact, Percival refers to testimony subsequently
offered by the EPA General Counsel that the decision had in fact been made by the EPA
Administrator. Id. For related discussion on how easy it always remains for administrators
to claim they have made the decision, see i,ifra Part III.
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opinions explaining their judgments. As legal realists long ago revealed, 
judges' obligation is not to explicate the true psychological explanations for 
their decisions, but rather to articulate reasons of a principled sort that are 
capable of some degree of abstraction.87 Moreover, seldom if ever are
judicial or administrative decisions only justifiable on impermissible 
grounds. Typically, decisions are grounded in a mix of psychological 
explanations as well as multiple legal and policy reasons.as As long as an 
agency's decision makes sense for one of the latter kinds of reasons, it can 
withstand scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious test, even if there 
may be other Qess reasoned) forces at work. For example, in opposing the 
EPA's revisions to new ozone standards in the fall of 2011, President 
Obama may well have found it politically expedient to have the EPA put 
off those new ozone standards until after the 2012 elections, but there also 
existed nonpolitical, policy reasons for delaying a change in such 
standards. 89 It was precisely those reasons that the President and the EPA 
administrator publicly offered (and perhaps also privately believed) for 
withdrawing the ozone rule. 90
Under the assumption that reasons other than obedience, and 
explanations other than psychological ones, must be offered in order for an 
agency action to withstand arbitrary and capricious review, we can now see 
that loyal obedience to a presidential order entails, as a practical matter, 
more than just taking the ordered action. When a president gives an 
administrator an order, obeying it loyally, as a political and moral matter 
let alone a constitutional one, will entail not only following the order but 
also providing a sufficiently independent policy rationale for doing so that 
will not readily subject the agency to a judicial remand following arbitrary 
and capricious review. In other words, true loyalty and obedience not only 
require an administrator to carry out a presidential order, but also to carry 
it out in a way that will successfully achieve the order's underlying 
objectives. The obedient administrator therefore not only carries out the 
87. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930); Max Radin, The Theory ofJudicialDecision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A.J. 
357 (1925). 
88. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF F'EDERALjUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE (2013). 
89. See supra notes 14-15 and i,yra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
90. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FuTURE OF GOVERNMENT 27 (2013) ("I
have referred, for example, to the president's decision not to support finalizing the 
Environmental Protection Agency's ozone rule. The decision was made on the merits. 
Contrary to published reports, it was not motivated by politics."). 
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President's wishes but also finds a way to defend them.91 
This full sense of what obedience means in practice makes clear how 
much of a lawyerly hypothetical it would be to ask what a court should do if 
an agency head were voluntarily to admit, point blank, "I only did this 
because the President ordered me to do so." Assuming that mere 
obedience is not a sufficient justification under the AP A, then making a 
bald, "the President made me do it" statement will not be obedient. Such 
statements only undermine presidents rather than support them. 
Realistically speaking, one must ask how many administrators would accept 
a legal du9 to obey their respective presidents-that is, accept that against 
all other evidence that they must do what their presidents have said-but 
then would also follow through in such a way as to undermine their 
agencies' ability to sustain their actions in court. In the end, even when it is 
clear, or ought to be clear to everyone, that obedience is probably the truest 
or strongest motivating reason for an administrative action, the faithful 
administrator can and still will easily act in a way that disavows that the 
President was the decider, simply by offering another explanation for the 
administrator's decision. 
The upshot is that the notion of a decisional limit on presidents is as 
empty in practice as it is conceptually. If it is a limit based on a notion of 
law-compelled obedience, then that understanding of what "law 
compelled" means must be a rather curious one, as it is not judicially 
enforceable. When administrators are faced with a presidential order, they 
face no court mechanism lurking in the background that can be used by the 
President to enforce that order. Even the arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review under the AP A does not help explain whether an administrator 
has a legal duty to obey a president's order.92 Although it might seem that 
the Supreme Court's rejection of presidential preference as a sufficient 
reason to withstand arbitrary and capricious review might in practice 
reinforce the notion of a decisional limit that constrains presidential action, 
APA review is actually orthogonal to the question of the legal obligation 
that adheres to a presidential order.93 Yes, the APA does hold implications 
for how an administrator should explain and justify agency actions, but if 
an administrator has a constitutional duty to obey a presidential order, then 
obedience would presumably dictate complying with that order as well as 
9 l. q. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 28 ("The heads of executive agencies are 
unlikely to say that presidential command has overridden agency judgment, rather than that 
presidential input has made for a more informed agency decision.") 
92. See supra notes 74-75.
93. See supra note 73.
• 
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providing some other reason to justify it. Given the ready availability of 
other reasons, as a practical matter, any concept of legal duty that 
apparently underlies a decisional limit brings forward nothing that looks 
like legal compulsion of any meaningful kind. 
Ill. EASY LEGAL ESCAPES 
The actual practice of presidential leadership and White House staff 
engagement with agencies supports this analysis of the emptiness of a 
decisional limit grounded in the rejection of a legal duty of an administrator 
to obey a president's order. That practice reveals that administrators have 
available to them a ready supply of persuasive arguments, on the merits, 
long before appeals to obedience to the President should ever need be 
invoked. As a result, even under the supposed decisional limit, a supply of 
public-regarding arguments and reasons are likely to be well at hand for 
any administrator to use when intending to follow a President's preferences. 
Furthermore, if an administrator responds affirmatively to a President's 
preferences, even if only because "the President said so," the conceptual 
and practical problems with the purported decisional limits doctrine make a 
series of easy escapes available to both presidents and administrators. At 
least four such escape strategies-all fully legal-can be readily identified 
and illustrated with recent examples. These four easy legal escapes mean 
that presidents can have whatever impact they will have on administrators' 
actions, even to the point of effectively deciding what the agency will do, 
without ever running afoul of an alleged decisional limit. The ready 
availability of these easy workarounds only reinforces the conclusion that a 
decisional limit is, practically speaking, devoid of meaningful practical 
import. 
A. WeSpeak
Presidents and administrators can deploy aollective rhetoric to 
characterize their actions, making responsibility for decisionmaking sound 
as if it has been shared. For example, standing with the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services at his side, President Obama used "we speak" 
throughout his announcement about a change in policy about whether 
religious institutions would be required to provide health coverage for 
contraceptive services: 
Today, we've reached a decision on how to move forward. Under the rule, women will 
still have access to free preventive care that includes contraceptive services-no 
matter where they work. So that core principle remains. But if a woman's employer 
is a charity or a hospital that has a religious objection to providing contraceptive 
services as part of their health plan, the insurance company-not the hospital, not the 
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charity-will be required to reach out and offer the woman contraceptive care free of 
charge, without co-pays and without hassles.94 
Other times, the decision may be characterized as one made by the 
"Administration," which is another way of collectivizing decisionmaking. 
Using the same example from the controversy over the contraceptive 
coverage rule, a rule that ultimately would need to be adopted by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, President Obama's press 
secretary explained: "I think that we decided, the administration decided • 
. . . that we need to provide these services that have enormous health 
benefits for American women, and that the exemption that we carved out is 
appropriate. "95 
Such rhetoric may well accurately describe how the participants 
themselves experience the decisionmaking process, as one where everyone 
is working together as a team. Indeed, decisionmaking across government 
is almost always a collective enterprise. For this reason, "we speak" 
rhetoric will seldom be disingenuous; however, it will also tend to mask any 
exertion of presidential control that might be said to have crossed the 
ineffable overseer-decider line. A decision that "we" made together is not 
the same as a president dictating an outcome to a reluctant but merely 
obedient administrator. 
B. 17ze President Requests
It is quite easy for Presidents to make clear what they expect their 
political appointees to do when it comes to domestic policy matters, such as 
rulemaking, without explicitly commanding those appointees to adopt a 
rule. 96 Presidents can simply "request" that agencies take the desired 
action. 
President Obama's surprising, and controversial, decision in 2011 to 
oppose an EPA revision to the nation's ambient air quality standard for 
ozone provides a good example.97 At the beginning of 2010, the EPA 
proposed tightening its standards for ground-level ozone, or smog. By July 
2011, the EPA announced it had initiated the "final step" in its rulemaking 
process by submitting the draft final rule to the White House Office of 
94. Obama, supra note 17 (emphasis added).
95. Jay Camey, Press Briefing, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 6, 2012, I :24 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2012/02/06/ press-briefing-press-secretary­
jay-camey-262012. For a related discussion of the practice of President Clinton announcing 
decisions made by his Administration, see Kagan, supra note 5. 
96. See Coglianese, supra note 26, at 643-44.
9 7. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review. The agency 
confidently reported that following that final step, the "EPA will finalize its 
reconsideration" and that "we look forward . to finalizing this standard 
shortly. "98 But in September 20 I I, President Obama issued a statement 
announcing the conclusion of the OIRA review process and his opposition 
to the EPA standards revision, using the language of "request": 
After careful consideration, I have requested that Administrator Jackson withdraw the draft 
Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards at this time. Work is already 
underway to update a 2006 review of the science that will result in the 
reconsideration of the ozone standard in 2013. Ultimately, I did not support asking 
state and local governments to begin implementing a new standard that will soon be 
reconsidered. 99 
On that same day, OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein sent a letter to 
EPA Administrator Jackson reiterating that the President had decided "to 
return this rule to you for reconsideration," as "he does not support 
finalizing the rule at this time." 100 Sunstein further wrote that "we believe 
that the draft final rule warrants your reconsideration" and that "I am 
requesting, at the President's direction, that you reconsider the draft final 
rule."tOt Interestingly, Sunstein's contrast of "request" and "direction" in 
the same sentence suggests that the President had directed his White House 
subordinate (Sunstein), but that he was not asserting the same directive 
authority over his EPA Administrator Oackson). Yet in reality there was no 
practical difference. 
Both Sunstein's letter and the President's statement exhibited impeccable 
legal draftsmanship, as one would have expected, in that they hewed to the 
asserted decisional limit imposed by the conventional understanding of the 
oversee:r-decider distinction. Nevertheless, the President achieved 
everything that he would have achieved had he or his OIRA Administrator 
written that the President had directed the EPA Administrator to withdraw 
the rule. The use of language that complied with the decisional limit 
appeared in no way to blunt the behavioral force of the President's action. 
There was no ambiguity about what the EPA Administrator needed to do. 
98. Regulatory Actions: Ozone Standards, ''EPA Updates Status of the Ozone Reconsideration",
EPA Guly 26, 2011), https:/ /web.archive.org/web/20111129130544/http://www. 
epa.gov /air/ ozonepollution/ actions.html. 
99. Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Ozone .Natwnal Ambient Air Q.uali9
Standards, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press­
office/2011 /09/02/ statement-President-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards 
(emphasis added). 
100. Sunstein, supra note 15.
101. Id.
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As a result, the same day President Obama's statement and OIRA 
Administrator Sunstein's letter were released, Administrator Jackson issued 
a statement that she would be reconsidering the revised standards. 
According to press accounts, Administrator Jackson and the rest of her EPA 
staff had been stunned and blindsided by the announcement. 102 Moreover, 
some press accounts asserted a linkage between the President's actions and 
his desire to protect his prospects for reelection.103 Nevertheless, the entire 
matter was handled in compliance with any purported decisional limitation 
on presidential authority over administrative action. 
C. The President Concurs
Presidents can also effectively direct their political appointees when they 
publicly announce their support for, or their opposition to, certain policy 
outcomes under the purview of their agencies. President Obama deployed 
this strategy in his statement on the ozone standard when he said he "did 
not support" having the EPA revise the standard at that time. 104 In 
connection with the HHS contraceptive coverage rule, President Obama's 
press secretary,Jay Camey, made one of the more candid efforts to employ 
this kind of framing, stating: "I want to make clear that the President's-or 
the Secretary's decision, and the President concurs with it, is that this 
coverage needs to be available to all American women."105 
Interestingly, press accounts of the White House deliberations over the 
contraceptive coverage rule make clear that there were highly divergent 
views among administration officials, prompting the President to make the 
ultimate decision in February 2012 to go forward with a narrow exemption 
for religious institutions.106 As suggested by the White House press 
I 02. See Robin Bravender, Obama Blindsides Enviros and EPA, POLITICO (Sept. 2, 2011, 
6:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/091 l /62586.html; Theo Emery, EPA 
Smog Rule R.ejection Stirs Anger at White House, BOSTON.COM (Sept. 2, 2011, 5:02 PM), 
http://archive.boston.com/201 l /09/02/blogsmog/corITMjmVTHupUenU 
NeM3N/story.html. 
I 03. See Broder, supra note 14. 
l 04. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
I 05. Press Briefi.ng by Press Secretary Jqy Carney, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 6, 2012, 12:39
PM), http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/06/press-briefing-press-
secretary-jay-carney-262012; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.. 
106. N.C. Aizenman, Peter Wallsten & Karen Tumulty, White House Compromise Still 
Guarantees Contraceptive Coverage far Women, WASH. POST (Feb. IO, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/white-house-to-announce-adjustment-to-birth­
control-rule/2012/02/ IO/ gIQArbFy3Q_story.html; Helene Cooper & Laurie Goodstein, 
Rule Shift on Birth Control Is Concession to Obama Allies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012), 
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secretary, the core policy choice was the President's decision: "I think that 
the decision to exempt churches and houses of worship . . . represents an 
effort to find [a] balance [between respect for religious beliefs and provision 
of women's health services], and [President Obama] believes he found the 
appropriate balance." 107 Still, it was much safer, at least in terms of raising 
concerns about the President exceeding any decisional limit, to concur in the 
decision of the HHS Secretary. Hence, the next day press secretary Camey 
emphasized that "the President understands these concerns [ about religious 
liberty]. That's why he agreed with the approach that Secretary Sebelius 
took, which sought that appropriate balance." 108
D. The Signer-as-Decider
A final strategy is to treat the signing of a legal document as the decision, 
so that as long as the administrator, and not the President, signs the 
document, the decision is made by the administrator. This is formally 
correct-and, as I will show in the next and final part of this Article, it 
constitutes a sensible way (indeed, the only sensible way) of operationalizing 
a general limit on presidential authority over administrators. A signer-as­
decider view makes coherent, for example, the EPA's position following a 
dispute over an earlier revision to its ozone standards in 2008, under the 
Bush Administration. That earlier dispute arose between the EPA and 
OIRA over what are called the "secondary" ambient ozone standards, 
which are intended to provide protection for a range of environmental 
effects broader than just threats to public health. 109
The EPA submitted a draft version of secondary air quality standards to 
OIRA. For the first time in its history, the EPA planned to make the 
secondary standard for ozone different from the primary standard. OIRA, 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2012/02/ 11 /health/policy/ obama-to-offer-accommoda tion-on­
birth-con trol-rule-officials-say .h uni. 
107. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jo;y Cam':)', THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 7, 2012, 1:59
PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2012/02/07 /press-briefing-press-
secretary-jay-camey-272012. 
108. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jo;y Cam':)', THE WHITE HOUSE {Feb. 8, 2012, 1:11
PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/08/press-briefing-press-
secretary-jay-camey-28 l 2. 
I 09. For an overview of the dispute, see Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules Weakened at Bush's 
Behest, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2008), http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/ content/ article/2008/03/ 13/ AR200803 l 304 l 7 5.html. 
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however, disagreed and favored keeping the two standards the same.110
Unable to reach an agreement, the EPA and OIRA used the conflict­
resolution provision of Executive Order 12,866 which provides that 
"disagreements or conflicts between or among agency heads or between 
[OIRA] and any agency that cannot be resolved by the Administrator of 
OIRA shall be resolved by the President ... with the relevant agency 
head."111 Ultimately, President Bush favored OIRA's position.1 2 
In its preamble to the final rule, the EPA noted that "the President 
'concluded that, consistent with Administration policy, added protection 
should be afforded to public welfare by strengthening the secondary ozone 
standard and setting it to be identical to the new primary standard, the 
approach adopted when ozone standards were last promulgated."' 113 
Although offering the admission that the President "concluded " to keep the 
standards the same, the EPA continued by explaining that, "While the 
Administrator fully considered the President's views, the Administrator's 
decision, and the reasons for it, are based on and supported by the record 
in this rulemaking." l 14 In subsequent testimony before the House 
Oversight Committee, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson provided 
further elaboration upon the process by which he arrived at the final rule: 
"Of course, as I believe good government, we went through the process as 
outlined by President Clinton's Executive order, and the President provided 
input. Ultimately, I made the decision .... "115 He further stated: 
I know that the chairman and other members of the committee disagree with my 
decision, and I understand that. These decisions are not easy decisions, but I made 
the right decision. I made the decision based upon the facts, based upon the law, what 
the law directs me to, and I stand by that. It was my decision and my decision 
alone.116 
How could it be that it was Administrator'sJohnson's decision alone? After 
all, the agency had also openly acknowledged the President's decisive role, 
I IO. For an account of the ozone proceeding, see Percival, Mo's in Charge?, supra note 
IO, at 2520-2 I. 
11 l. Exec. Order No.12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,743 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
112. See Eilperin, supra note 109.
113. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,497
(Mar. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58) (quoting Letter from Susan Dudley, 
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and 
Budget, to StephenJohnson, Administrator, EPA (Mar. 12, 2008)). 
114. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. at 16,497.
115. EPA 's New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform,
110th Cong. 109 (2008). 
116. Id. at 145.
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resolving the dispute elevated by the OIRA Administrator by rejecting the 
position put forward by the agency. Johnson's statement is nevertheless 
compatible with a signer-as-decider view of decisionmaking. This 
formalistic view treats an administrative "decision" as the official approval 
and culmination of an agency action which is effectuated by the 
administrator or other duly designated agency official affixing a signature 
on the rule document. As long as only one signature appears on the 
necessary document-the administrator's-an agency head can always 
claim that no matter what the President may have concluded, expressed, or 
even ordered, the decision ultimately was the administrator's alone. 
IV. A BRIGHT-LINE LIMIT ON PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
For some readers, a signer-as-decider argument might appear to amount 
to little more than cramped formalism. But there is something to be said 
for formalism in this particular context. As an initial matter, let us not 
forget that a formalistic understanding of signing-as-deciding already 
comports with widespread practices and norms within administrative 
agencies.1 17 Administrator Johnson's reliance on his signature might look 
like an attempt to remake history, but his tacit invocation of the signer-as­
decider account presumably was not entirely an ad hoc attempt at 
rationalization-any more than it has been with the actions taken by other 
administrations. Quite the contrary, a formalist emphasis on an 
administrator's signature already pervades bureaucratic practice. After all, 
administrators do not research and draft rules all on their own; they 
nevertheless still make "the decision" by signing the final documents that 
their staffs prepare. Until an agency rule or other document is signed by 
the head of the agency, or other authorized agency official, the agency 
officially has taken no final action reviewable by the courts and the text of 
an agency document can still be modified without necessarily needing to 
restart the administrative process.118 
11 7. It is also well accepted by courts that such formalities as signatures and publication 
in the Federal Register are crucial for determining when administrative action has become 
final, that is, when a decision has been made. See, e.g., Impact Energy Res., LLC v. Salazar, 
693 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2012) (even though the Secretary orally announced a decision, the 
final decision was not made until two days later when the mining claims were actually signed 
by the Secretary); cf. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,470 (1994) (noting that where a statute 
confers authority on the President to close military bases upon the recommendation of a 
commission, they do not close "without the President's approval"). 
118. The APA authorizes judicial review of"final" actions by agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 704
(2012). See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (noting that to be
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To be sure, it is well understood that formalist, bright-line rules can be 
over-inclusive or under-inclusive, and thus, at times, dysfunctionally 
rigid. I 19 Scholars have for this reason thoughtfully argued against a 
uniform reliance on a rigid adherence to a formalist conception of the 
constitutional separation of powers. 120 Yet even supporters of 
functionalism, understood more broadly as the legal view that favors 
standards over bright-line rules, should acknowledge that certain 
specifications or applications of functionalism can prove dysfunctional 
too. 121 Such dysfunctional functionalism is what results from a purported 
decisional limit on presidential control of domestic policymaking and 
administration. The overseer-decider distinction, viewed in functionalist 
terms as prohibiting "too much" presidential meddling in the affairs of 
administrative agencies, simply does not and cannot work to cabin 
presidential power. It is not only a concept that courts will be unable to 
enforce or refine, for the reasons discussed in this Article and because the 
opportunities for judicial review will remain practically nonexistent. But 
the purported constraints provided by the overseer-decider distinction can 
also be easily circumvented by honoring it in practice using one or more of 
the easy legal escapes I have highlighted.122 
Of course, even the most influential advocate of a decisional limit, 
Professor Strauss, has fully acknowledged the difficulties of line drawing 
based on a distinction that depends on the "ineffable" qualities of 
administrative decisionmaking.123 However, he has nevertheless suggested 
that the overseer-decider distinction still helpfully "reinforces the 
considered "final" agency "action must mark the 'consummation' of the agency's 
decisionmaking process") (citation omitted); Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330, 
334 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("We may review final agency rules. But we do not have authority to 
review proposed rules.") (citation omitted). 
119. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 992-93 (1995).
120. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 9; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between 
Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV.J.L. & Pue. PoL'Y 21 (1998). 
121. The conception of functionalism I have in mind here is one that stands in
opposition to formalism's preference for bright-line rules. See Eskridge, supra note 120, at 21. 
122. See supra Part III.
I 23. Strauss, Ouerseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 712-13; see also id. at 704
(acknowledging that the overseer-decider distinction is "subtle"). Of course, it is not just 
administrative decisionmaking that can be ineffable; decisionmaking within the White 
House can be too. See John F. Kennedy, Foreword to THEODORE C. SORENSON, DECISION­
MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS xi (1963) (noting 
that "the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer--often, indeed, 
to the decider himselP'). 
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psychology of office for the administrator." 124 No empirical evidence has 
been put forward to support such a claim. Nevertheless, the belief, or 
actually faith, seems to be that a decisional limit offers a valuable behavioral 
reinforcement to administrators, reminding them that ultimately they are 
"the deciders." This may well be the best possible defense that can be made 
of a decisional limit built upon an overseer-decider distinction. Perhaps 
relying on this distinction will, notwithstanding all of its other weaknesses, 
help remind political appointees that Presidents can sometimes overreach 
and that there exists some proper limit on presidential involvement in the 
work of administrative agencies. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of such a belief, I am skeptical of this defense 
of a decisional limit for several reasons. For one reason, as noted, we have 
no evidence to support it. For another, given the murkiness and plasticity 
of the purported overseer-decider distinction, it is hard to imagine how it 
really could bolster presidential appointees' sense of their own 
independence vis-a-vis the President. As I have suggested here and 
elsewhere, partisans tend to view constitutional claims about presidential 
control of domestic policymaking using their own ideological lens. 125 Most 
political appointees will generally share the President's ideological 
predispositions, and so the times when White House intrusiveness appears 
to a presidential appointee to cross the murky line will likely be few, if any. 
Moreover, one can count on the White House to claim that the President is 
still well within the permissible side of the overseer-decider line. The 
murkiness of the asserted legal doctrine inherently limits its ability to come 
to the political appointee's aid in resisting a motivated White House bent 
on using its available incentives to influence an administrator. 
If presidential appointees do need something that can help reinforce 
their proverbial backbone, it would seem more natural to call for something 
other than a spongy legal distinction. That, of course, is a virtue of a 
bright-line rule. By defining decisions not by reference to some ineffable 
qualities but instead by seeing them in purely formal terms, based on the 
signing of a legal document, the law can and does place some constraint on 
presidential overreach. Presidents can cajole, shout, and threaten all they 
want, and they can even direct, command, control, decide, and order. 
However, at the end of the day, if the statute specifically empowers an 
124. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 714. Professors Pildes and Sunstein
have similarly suggested that "it may be important to acknowledge that, as a technical 
matter, the decision rests with the agency head" because that view "might bolster agency 
heads in their conflicts with the White House." Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 25. 
125. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 26.
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administrator and no one else, then presidents must get their administrator 
to sign off on an administrative order or rule. A signature limit, not a 
decisional limit, provides a meaningful legal line, clearly determining who 
must be the one to act in order to make an administrative action final. 
It will be true, of course, that political appointees will typically share the 
views of the Presidents that they serve, and that due to feelings of loyalty or 
policy affinity they will often accept direction from their presidents even if 
they might otherwise have been inclined to act differently. But as we have 
seen, this remains true even if one accepts the existence of a decisional limit 
based on the overseer-decider distinction. 
It is also the case, though, that political appointees have careers, political 
bases, and ultimately minds of their own, and a formally demarcated 
separation of authority will offer at least occasional resistance to presidential 
influence.126 Presidents must persuade someone else to sign off, and they 
are not always successful in doing so. 127 During the Bush Administration, 
the White House chief of staff, Andrew Card, and White House counsel, 
Alberto Gonzales, paid a widely reported visit to the hospital bed of 
126. For discussions of the challenges that a president faces in keeping agency heads
focused on advancing the President's agenda, see Coglianese & Firth, supra note 25, at 1906 
(explaining why "much in the political science literature .. . could reasonably lead one to 
question" the assumption that agency heads "would automatically fold were it not for the 
overseer-decider standard"); Andrew Prokop, Trump is Setting Up the Government in a Wqy Tiiat 
Promises Chaos, Vox Gan. 20, 2017, 8:43 AM), http://www.vox.com/20l 7/ l / l 9/ 
14265392/trump-cabinet-executive-branch (discussing researchers' conclusions that even 
after a White House develops "an overall strategy for the administration's success ... each 
Cabinet official tends to end up primarily concerned with his or her department's particular 
concerns," producing "a recipe for conflict"); cf. Jennifer Steinhauer, .laiest ro Disagree With 
Donald Trump: His Cabinet Nominees, N.Y. TL\fES Gan. 12, 2017), https:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 
2017 /0 I/ 12/us/politics/trump-cabinet-mattis-tillerson .html (noting that "in their first 
week of grilling before congressional panels, Mr. Trump's cabinet nominees broke with him 
on almost every major policy that has put Mr. Trump outside Republican orthodoxy"). 
127. See Percival, Who's in Charge?, supra note 10, at 2534 (noting that "time after time
when White House officials tried to persuade agency heads to make decisions for reasons 
that deviated from statutory commands, agency heads have resisted"). Percival takes agency 
· officials' resistance as evidence of the President's lack of any directive authority, but it is also
fully consistent with a view that Presidents possess directive authority even though that
authority can only be enforced by the exercise of the President's separate removal authority.
For present purposes, the point is simply that, regardless of which view of the directive
authority applies, it is the legal requirement that someone other than the President must sign
off on agency action that affords agency heads the opportunity to resist presidential
entreaties. Recognizing the emptiness of a decisional limit on presidential involvement in
the administrative state does not eliminate the opportunity for agency resistance.
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Attorney Generaljohn Ashcroft to try to get him to reauthorize a domestic 
surveillance program. The incident offers a telling example of the real limit 
created by a bright-line signature rule. As described in the Washington Post: 
In vivid testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee yesterday, [Deputy Attorney 
GeneralJames] Corney said he alerted FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III and raced, 
sirens blaring, to join Ashcroft in his hospital room, arriving minutes before Gonzales 
and Card. Ashcroft, summoning the strength to lift his head and speak, ref used to 
sign the papers they had brought. Gonzales and Card, who had never acknowledged 
Corney's presence in the room, turned and left.128 
Such is an example of success "in applying the constraints of law to the 
world of politics." 129
Advocates of a decisional standard should have no real objection to a 
bright-line signature rule. The requirement for an administrator's 
signature could even be said to serve as the best way to make a decisional 
limit operational. Moreover, both types of limits-signature and 
decisional-are premised on the view that statutory delegations to agency 
heads vest legal authority to act in those officials, not in the President. Yet 
a decisional limit purports to sweep more broadly than a signature limit, 
and therein lies its undoing. A signature limit is clear and circumscribed. It 
effectively allows for any presidential influence short of the President 
signing a document purporting to authorize agency action without the 
administrator's signature.130 By contrast, adherents of a decisional view 
hold that a President can become an impermissible decider through other 
means, even though they really cannot specify a principled account of what 
those other means might be. 
A decisional limit implies that at some point presidents can exert so 
much influence over agencies that administrators can no longer be said to 
have made the relevant decisions, even presumably if the administrators are 
the ones to sign the authorizing documents. That view, as I have shown in 
this Article, is empty in that it offers no coherent or reliable legal basis for 
determining what constitutes "too much" presidential influence. With the 
signature limit, by contrast, the legal difference between permissible and 
impermissible presidential involvement is not subtle in any way. The 
signature limit's clarity provides its chief virtue in what is often the heated, 
highly political environment of administrative governance. The formality 
128. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST (May 16,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/ article/2007 /05/ 15/ AR20070 
51500864.html. 
129. Strauss, Overseer or Decider?, supra note 11, at 713.
130. Coglianese & Firth, supra note 25, at 1877.
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of the administrator's signature protects the law in this context from 
delegitimizing politicization while still offering undeniable reinforcement of 
an administrator's legal authority, even for the administrator who may on 
occasion be confined to a hospital bed. 
CONCLUSION 
No matter how well intentioned, advocates of decisional limits on 
presidential authority over domestic policymaking have offered a doctrinal 
position that lacks both conceptual clarity and practical import. The fuzzy 
distinction typically made between oversight and decisionmaking may at a 
superficial level seem to offer some salve to political commentators and 
administrative law scholars who seek constraints on presidential authority. 
But realistically we should not kid ourselves into ,-thinking that trying to 
embed into separation-of-powers law an ethereal concept such as a 
"decision" can do much to affect presidential power. Presidents can and do 
easily find ways to direct agency heads even while respecting a purported 
decisional limit on presidential involvement in the administrative state. 
Moreover, there is a real risk, supported with empirical evidence, that 
continued invocation of a plastic decisional limit unnecessarily drags 
constitutional law into the middle of polarized political controversy, 
ultimately weakening the law's legitimacy. 131 
To question the meaningfulness of decisional limits on presidential 
authority is not to abandon administrative law's aspirations to constrain 
governmental authority, even at the highest levels. Rather, those 
aspirations are the precise reason that legal scholars should abandon a 
distinction that is both too muddled to make a difference and that presents 
a risk of undermining the legitimacy of law, thus potentially weakening 
law's impact in other realms where it both can work and needs to work. In 
contrast to the feebleness of a purported decisional limit, the formality of 
the requirement that a statutorily authorized official must sign a document 
for administrative action to take legal effect allows the law to impose a 
tangible limit on presidential power. When someone else has to sign off, a 
president must convince that person with signing authority to follow the 
131. See Coglianese & Firth, supra note 25, at 1908-09. For a detailed empirical study
showing how the legitimacy of the Supreme Court can be tarnished by politics, see JAMES L. 
GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY 
THEORY AND THEjUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009). For legal commentary on 
the dangerousness of contaminating legal institutions with "ordinary politics," see, for 
example, Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountabili!J, and /nterbranch 
Relations, 95 GEO. LJ. 909 (2007). 
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President's wishes. Sometimes this will be easy, no doubt. But 
administrators' own egos and the pride they have in their agencies' missions 
or their own professional integrity will at times bolster their fortitude, and 
perhaps even imbue them with stubbornness, making it potentially even 
more difficult for an overbearing president to influence the outcome. 
These issues play out even in matters involving the military, with its 
much stronger culture and norms of obedience to hierarchical command, 
not to mention the independent constitutional basis for a president's 
commander-in-chief authority. l32 Indeed, the relationship between 
presidents and military leaders still can involve a tremendous amount of 
staff work, appeals to reason and analysis, turf fighting and bargaining, and, 
undoubtedly less frequently, resort to background threats of budgetary 
repercussions, personnel removal or reassignment, or other consequences. 
Presidents and their secretaries of defense know that they cannot easily boss 
the military brass around, at least not on any matters of great 
consequence.133 The brass can and do push back when they think the 
President is making a mistake. Similar behavior can and does occur with 
political appointees charged with carrying out domestic responsibilities. 
The bare realities implicit in heading any collective enterprise-whether 
it is running a major corporation or leading the Executive Branch-place 
practical limits on the leader's ability simply to command compliance, as 
opposed to inducing it. That is why political scientist Richard Neustadt 
acknowledged long ago that presidential power ultimately depends on the 
"power to persuade."134 Although a presidential directive may seem so 
powerful that it needs to be cabined by something like a decisional limit, an 
explicit appeal by a president to a legal duty to obey is, practically speaking, 
not a very powerful move. In addition to all the weaknesses in the 
decisional limits doctrine that I have explicated in this Article, at the end of 
the day if a White House must rely on obedience to law to see an agency 
implement the President's policy agenda, this is actually a sign of 
presidential weakness, politically and practically speaking, rather than of 
strength. It is time for legal scholars to recognize more clearly the realities 
of presidential power and to acknowledge the limits of-and even perils 
132. See CONST. art. II, § 2. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (noting "the plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations"). 
133. It is telling that former Defense Secretary Robert Gates devotes an entire chapter
in his memoir to "Waging War on the Pentagon." ROBERT M. GATES, Dtrrv: MEMOIRS OF 
A SECRETARY AT WAR 115-48 (2014). 
134. NEUSTADT, supra note 55, at 42.
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of-continuing to interject constitutional law into inherently contested 
political realms when the proffered doctrinal version of that law is both 
conceptually and behaviorally empty. 
